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Case studies of natural resource access in Jharkhand, 
India: Implications for ’democratic’ decentralisation
Introduction
Many developing countries have undertaken attempts at 
democratic decentralisation of their natural resources
sectors. These reforms affect local residents’ access to 
natural resources, promising to devolve power and control 
over these to local institutions. The extent of
decentralisation shapes the nature of access and the kind 
of local governance taking place, both crucial issues in a 
developing country context of relatively unstable politics, 
overlapping policies, and marginalised population groups 
relying on natural resources. 
Moreover, the ability of local residents to benefit from
natural resources, which has been termed ‘access’ by 
Ribot & Peluso (2003), is also shaped by factors other than 
decentralisation policy. 
This policy brief illustrates that decentralisation can only 
effectively support residents’ access to natural resources if 
it both resolves policy overlaps at multiple levels to bring 
about inclusive and equitable access and aligns policies 
with ground realities for specific natural resources.
   
This brief is based on research situated in the Indian state 
of Jharkhand with case studies of natural resource access 
in four village communities in the Sadar Chaibasa forest 
division, each comprising approximately 100 households 
spread across two to three hamlets. Data collection involved 
semi-structured interviews with residents including
loggers, field observations, and key informant interviews 
with non-wood forest product (NWFP) traders, local
councillors, sub-district-level bureaucrats, village chiefs, 
local NGO staff and regional researchers.
The focus is on three important resources with diverse 
supply chains: (i) kendu leaves (Diospyros melanoxylon), 
the only nationalised NWFP whose trade is governmentally 
regulated in practice (Suykens 2010); (ii) mahua (Madhuca 
longifolia) flowers, whose collection for sale is most
widespread, with 97.2 % village households collecting 
them (Singh & Quli 2011); and (iii) wood, which is illegal 
to log but whose sale makes the highest contribution to 
household incomes (Jewitt 2008).
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•	 National decentralisation policies must be consistently operationalised through state-level legislation and local-level implementation 
to devolve power and resources to local democratic institutions.
•	 State policies must be closely aligned with ground realities to ensure that local inhabitants and users can meaningfully exercise deci-
sion-making power over natural resource access.
•	 Natural resource governance policies must be appropriate for each resource’s supply chain, so as to empower the most marginal-
ised, resource-dependent groups of local inhabitants and users.
Policy Recommendations 
Policies
National legislation empowers the village assembly, a
community-level institution based on deliberative
democracy, to manage natural resources (land, forest,
water, excluding major minerals) in accordance with
traditions, and mandates state-level legislation to “be in 
consonance with the customary law [...] and traditional 
management practices of community resources” (GoI 1996: 
clause 4a). This legislation accords ownership of NWFPs 
to the community-level village assembly and three higher 
tiers of self-government institutions at the village-cluster, 
sub-district and district levels, known as Panchayat Raj 
Institutions (GoI 1992).
However, despite constitutional mandates, state-level
legislation does not operationalise these ownership rights, 
instead giving village assemblies the right to manage
natural resources, and according the higher-level
self-governance institutions powers of “collection,
processing, storage and marketing” of NWFPs (GoJ 2001). 
It furthermore makes the exercise of these limited powers 
subject to unspecified rules and orders of the state
government. This enables the Jharkhand government to
create state monopolies in the trade of specific forest
products by appointing agents, such as the Jharkhand State 
Forest Development Corporation, to regulate trade in these 
products (Sareen 2016).
Kendu leaves
The only example of a nationalised NWFP in Jharkhand is 
the kendu leaf. Commercially valuable for rolling around
tobacco in the manufacture of country cigarettes called 
’bidis’, its labour-intensive collection invariably involves 
very poor village households. Its supply-chain includes 
village-level collection agents, who pay collectors a fixed 
low rate per standard bag of kendu leaves. These agents 
operate on a commission basis for kendu leaf contractors 
who place winning bids in government auctions of
predetermined kendu leaf lots.
The government thus generates revenue and the
contractors purchase the right to trade kendu leaves at 
free-market rates, making high returns from getting
tobacco rolled in the kendu leaves and selling the resulting 
bidis to retailers (for further details, see Sareen 2016). Since 
winning auctions requires capital which forest villagers
typically lack, access to this natural resource favours urban 
elites from Jharkhand’s towns as contractors.
Drying mahua flowers. Photo Siddharth Sareen
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 Mahua flowers
The Jharkhand government’s predecessor tried nationalising 
mahua flowers, an NWFP valuable for producing distilled 
liquor, but failed due to powerful regional traders’ efforts 
to maintain control of this trade. Distilling this liquor is, 
however, illegal in Jharkhand due to government directives, 
which excludes small-scale local traders and villagers from 
accessing a large portion of benefits from mahua flowers.
The mahua flower supply-chain begins with village
households that own trees and collect the flowers.
These are sold at weekly village markets called haats to 
local agents, who gain commissions for their role as
middlemen for regional traders. These traders have the 
financial, social and physical capital to strike deals in states 
neighbouring Jharkhand, hire trucks for transport, and sell 
mahua flowers where distilling liquor is allowed.
They purchase the flowers via agents at 15-25 rupees per 
kilogram from villagers during the month-long collection 
season around April each year: villagers need the farming 
off-season income and cannot afford to stockpile flowers. 
A few villagers with some financial cushion reported being 
offered two to three times these prices later in the year 
when supply is low and demand high, indicating high profit 
margins for the regional traders.
Timber and fuel wood
Access to wood is more complicated than for NWFPs. 
Village inhabitants have collection rights to dry wood for 
domestic use both in village assembly-managed forests and 
in Forest Department-managed forests. However,
regulating access is unfeasible at present due to lack of 
systematic monitoring, and loggers can chop green wood, 
leave it to dry and then transport it. In practice, hundreds 
of loggers bicycle wood loads along dirt tracks and roads 
every day, from the studied forest villages to the outskirts 
of Chaibasa 20-30 kilometres away, where they sell them to 
soap factories and urban households as fuel wood. Larger, 
shaped logs are sold in more limited numbers as timber 
to upcoming town houses. A logger can sell three bicycle 
loads weekly, with frequency highest during winter and 
lowest during monsoon rains.
While sale is illegal, the Forest Department lacks the
capacity and political will to apprehend loggers, as wood 
sale provides crucial household income in the absence of
alternative local livelihood options. In the four forest villages 
studied, only one with unusually strong leadership and 
high social cohesion managed to regulate access to wood 
through its village assembly during 2012-15, by proactively 
demanding and using Forest Department support; others 
tried but were unable to regulate access due to social
pressure from other villages and their own residents in the 
absence of governmental support. While inhabitants of 
these villages log and sell wood, they are nonetheless
concerned about the diminishing wood reserves in and 
around their village forests, as outsiders from non-forest 
villages also log there.
At present, the option of short-term local income trumps 
their longer-term worries about lack of domestic timber
and fuel wood.
Conclusion
1. The two NWFP cases show how, despite national-level 
mandates, the Jharkhand government’s policies adversely 
impact forest village inhabitants’ access to natural
resources, undermining constitutional policies and the
objectives of democratic decentralisation. Government
revenue generation from kendu leaf trade enables local 
elites to profit at free-market rates as bidi contractors while 
primary collectors are forced to accept
government-specified low rates. The governmental ban 
on distilling liquor enables regional traders to capture high 
profits from mahua flowers while forcing village households 
to sell them at low rates. Thus, inequitable access continues 
in spite of and even in the guise of attempts to decentralise.
2. The case of timber and fuel wood demonstrates the 
importance of making policies that are feasible to
implement and appropriate for ground realities. Logging 
and wood sale continue despite being illegal as
enforcement is not possible without empowering village 
assemblies and supporting local governance through Forest
Department assistance. 
While one forest village constituted a successful example 
showing this is possible with strong proactive leaders and 
high social cohesion, it was an exception rather than the 
rule; by and large, local democratic institutions remain weak 
and continue lacking adequate governmental support.
3. Access to natural resources in Jharkhand continues to 
favour elites at the cost of local inhabitants. In the case of 
wood, unregulated access continues to threaten the future 
natural resource base of forest villagers in their own
estimate based on local knowledge, due to the lack of
alternative local livelihoods. Solving this problem requires 
generating sufficient alternative means of livelihood. 
On the one hand, this is possible by strengthening delivery 
of existing initiatives such as a national scheme aimed at
providing rural minimum-wage work for 100 days per 
household per year. On the other, it requires ensuring a 
greater income share for these inhabitants through more 
inclusive, equitable access to natural resources. This is only 
possible with more substantive efforts at democratic
decentralisation that strengthen local governance and
institutions of self-government.
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